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724 S. SIWEL Co. 1.1. COUNTY OF Los ANGELES [27 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 18935~In Bank. Mar. 19. 1946.J 
S. SIWEL CO. (a Corporation), Appellant, v. COUNTY OF 
flOS ANnELRS et 81..~e~onaents. 
[1] Improvements-Public - Assessment - Enforcement. - Where 
all of the outstandiJ!g improvement bonds issued by a city 
under the Acquisitid'iJ and Improvement Act of 1925 (8tats. 
1925, p. 849; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1931, Aet 3276a; repealed 
by 8tats. 1933, p. 949) were purchased and canceled by the 
eounty pursuant to legislation eI!acted for the relief of property i 
owners of special assessment districts (8tats. 1935. chap. 354; 
Deering's Gt'n. Laws. Act 33031: 8ts. & Hy. Code, §§ 1625.5-
1628). the assessments theretofore Jpvied by the city eould not 
be legally pnfor(led by thp county. anrl thp amount of delin-
quent assessments pairl bv a propertv owner under protest was 
either "erroneouslv or iIIe!!,aIlv eollecterl" from lItleh owner 
within the meanin~ of Rpv. & Tax. Corlt'. § 509fi 
[2] Taxation-Remedies of Taxpayer-Olaim for Taxes Errone-
ously Collected.-Rev. & Tax. Code. fi 5096. is not limited to the 
recovery of taxes erroneously or ilIe~ally levied. but authorizes 
thp refund of t./l~P" "pY'Y'onpnll~lv nr illP!!'RIlV (lolJp('tprl." 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Alfred L. Bartlett, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action to recover special assessments paid under protest. 
Judgment of dismissal after sustaining general demurrer to 
eomplaint without leavE' to amena. reversed with directions. ' 
Murphey & Davis and Alex W. Davis for Appellant. 
J. H. O'Connor. County Counsel, A. Curtis Smith, Deputy 
County Counsel, and Clyde Woodworth, City Attorney 
(South Gate), for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, .T.-Under protest the S. Siwel Co. paid spe-
cial assessments levied by the eity of South Gate, and brought 
this action to obtain a refund. Upon the appeal from the 
[1) See 9 Cal.Jur. to-Yr. Supp. 575. 
MeR. Dig. References: [lJ Improvements-Public, § 35; [2J Tax· 
atioD, § 29L 
) 
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judgment of dismissal entered after a genera] demurrer to the 
complaint was sustained and leave to amend denied, the ques-
tions presented for decisIon concern the validity of the assess-
ments and the scop~f certain sections of the Revenue and 
Taxation Code. 
The facts alleged in the complaint and a proposed amended 
complaint may be summarize~ as follows: The appellant is 
the owner of land in the city of South Gate bordering on 
Wright Road, a highway o~general county use. The highway 
was improved pursuant to a proceeding had under the Ac-
quisition and Improvement Act of 1925, commonly known as 
the Mattoon Act (Stats. 1925, p. 84'9; Deering's Gen. Laws, 
Act 3276a; repealed by Sta!..". ]933, chap. 346, p. 949). In 
1929, Acquisition and Improyement bonds to the amount of 
$43,400 were issued and sold. Special assessments were levied 
against lands in the district, of which the appellant's property 
constituted a large part. Levies for the years 1929-1933, inclu-
sive, were paid b~' the Siwel Company, but assessments of the 
four subsequent years, 1934-1937, inclusive, were allowed 
to become delinquent. Only about 9 per cent of such assess-
ments were paid by the property owners and the district was 
in economic distress. 
Prior to June, 1938, bonds in the principal amount of $4,000 
and interest had been paid in full, but of the outstanding 
bonds in the principal sum of $39,400, approximately $16,000 
were delinquent in payment of principal and all were delin-
quent in payment of interest. The country was passing 
through a period of severe economic depression and the land 
values in the district shrank to a point where the total assessed 
valuation of all the taxable property within the district was 
at times less than the face value of the amounts outstanding 
on the bonded indebtedness. Taxes and assessments against a 
large percentage of the property in the district had been 
delinquent for five years and unless financial aid was made 
available, a considerable portion of the property would be 
stricken from the tax rolls. 
Appropriate legislation had been enacted for the relief of 
districts in distress (Stats. 1935, p. 1250; Deering's Gen. 
Laws, Act 3303lj Sts. & Hwy. Code, §§ 1625.5-1628 as amended 
by Stats. 1935, pp. 2178, 2199, Stats. 1937, p. 160). In 1938, 
acting pursuant to these provisions and prior to the levy of 
liny assessment for that year, the board of supervisors 01 
Los Angeles County adopted a resolution which, after reciting 
) 
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that Acquisition antI Impl'ovemeL\t District No. 11 of the city 
of South Gate was in economic clistJ·css because of excessive 
and burdensome special assdr"ments and eligible for relief 
under sections 1626, 1627 and ]628 of the Streets and High-
ways Code, ordered that the 'county should purchase all of 
the outstanding bonds anq.;.deliver the~ to the city for can-
cellation. Pursuant to the resolution, all of the outstanding 
bonds were purchased and delivered to the treasurer of the 
city of South Gate. By order of ~he board of trustees of 
the city, on July 13, 1938, all of the bonds were canceled. 
The appellant's demand thereafter made that the assess-
ments for the years 1934-1937 be canceled was rejected by 
both the city and county. S. Siwel Co. then made payment 
under protest, and filed a timely claim for refund, followed by 
commencement of the present suit. 
In challenging the ruling of the trial court that these facts 
do not state a cause of action entitling the Siwel Company 
to a refund of the amounts paid by it to discharge the assess-
ments levied prior to the retirement of the bonds, the appel-
lant takes the position that the assessments were collectible 
only for the purpose of meeting the obligation on the bonds., 
and the right to do so ceased to exist when the bonds were pahl 
and canceled. Therefore, the argument continues, unless the 
amount paid to satisfy the assessments for the years 1934-
1937 is refunded, the city will be unjustly enriched. And: 
the appellant asserts that the procedure specified by the 
Revenue and Taxation Code may be used by a property owner 
to obtain a refund of assessments paid under the circum-
stances related in the complaint. 
The city and the county contend that the cancellation of 
the bonds raised no bar to the collection of assessments there-
tofore levied. Under section 1626 of the Streets and High-
ways Code, it is said, the legislative body of the city was given 
discretionary power to direct the cancellation of any unpaid 
taxes and assessments, and in the exercise of that discretion 
decided not to cancel the assessments levied before 1938 
against the property of the appellant and other property 
owners in the assessment district. If assessments levied prior 
to 1938 are canceled, the respondents assert, the landowners 
who defaulted in their obligations will obtain a benefit denied 
to those who paid the assessments placed against their prop-
erties. 
The Acquisition and Improvement Act, supra, pursuant to 
) 
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which the assessments now challenged by the appellant were 
levied, provided a methodifor the construction of street im-
provements and the acquisition of land therefor. The legis-
lative body of any municipality was authorized by the statute 
to determine, after appropriate notoice and hearing, the im-
provements which were to be made and the district which 
would be specially benefited by the improvements. 
By the terms of the stathte, the cost of an improvement 
was to be met by the issuance of bonds against the real prop-
erty to be specially benefited by the improvements. Payment 
of the bonds was to be made out of a'special fund to be eon-
stituted by the municipality for each district in which such 
bonds were issued. Each year, at the time of levying taxes 
for general municipal purposes, the city was required to levy 
against all lands within the district, "a special assessment 
tax in an amount clearly sufficient, together with any moneys 
which are or may be in said fund, to pay all the principal 
which has become or will become due and all interest which 
has become or will become payable on the bonds . . . before 
the proceeds of another . . . levy of taxes to be collected for 
general municipal purposes . . . can be made available for 
the payment of said principal and interest." These special 
assessment taxes, the statute read, should be "in addition 
to all other taxes levied for ... municipal purposes" (§ 41). 
The city of South Gate has delegated its functions relating 
to the collection of taxes to the county of Los Angeles. By 
the terms of the Acquisition and Improvement Act, levies for 
the payment of principal and interest requirements upon the 
bonds were to be "collected and enforced in the same manner 
and by the same persons and at the same time and with the 
same penalties and interest as are other taxes." Also, the 
statute speciiically adopted the procedure provided by gen-
eral law for the collection of taxes for general municipal 
purposes. (§ 41.) 
Act 3303l declares that city and county legislative bodies 
are "hereby fully and completely authorized and empowered, 
on the consent of the owners or holders of such bonds or 
indebtedness, to purchase, adjust, liquidate or cancel such 
bonds or indebtedness, or any part of them or it, and to carry 
out any plan or plans for the purchase, adjustment, liquida-
tion, or cancellation of such bonds or indebtedness, or any 
part of them or it," and to "adjust, waive or cancel in whole 
or in part, any tax or taxes, assessment or assessments, penalty 
) 
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or penalties and interest heretofore levied or taxed against any 
of the property or properties in such special assessment district 
which have been taxed or levied for the purpose of meeting 
the bonds or indebt_ness of such special assessment dis-
tricts." (§ 1.)- Such legislative bodies are also authorized 
"to appropriate and use any-'and all necessary funds, moneys, 
taxes, assessments and contrib~ions, from whatsoever source I 
derived, for the furtherance, consummation and conclusion of ' 
the purchase, adjustment, liquidation' or cancellation of any 
bond or bonds ... in whole or in part of such districts, and 
to pay from such funds, moneys, taxes, assessments and con-
tributions all expenses necessary to carry on the furtherance, 
consummation and conclusion of such plan or plans." (§ 3.) 
Section 1626 of the Streets and Highways Code provides 
that "boards of supervisors in their respective counties may 
purchase or redeem at a discount, and may at any time in their 
discretion cancel or retire, bonds of any special assessment 
district, for the payment of which special assessments . . • 
have been or are to be levied, if the proceeds of such bonds 
are or have been used exclusively for the acquisition of rights 
of way or easements for, or for the construction, maintenance, 
improvement or repair of highways, bridges or culverts within 
such county or any city therein. The board may also pay any 
portion of the principal or interest of, or transfer such amount 
as the board deems proper to the interest and sinking fund 
for the discharge and payment of, any of such bonds." 
Section 1626.5 of the Streets and Highways Code reads, 
in part, as follows: "In accordance with the provisions of sec-
tions 1627 and 1628, the boards of supervisors, in their re-
spective counties, may appropriate money to refund, repay 
and adjust, by any method established by law, the principal, 
or any portion of the principal, of any special assessments or , 
bonds issued to represent special assessments, which have I 
become liens on lands and which have been levied under the 
direct or specific assessment method to pay for the acquisition 
of rights of way or easements for, or the construction, main- " 
tenance, improvement or repair of public highways, bridges, 
or culverts within such county or any city therein." 
In enacting legislation for the relief of the property owners;" 
in special assessment districts (Stats. 1935, chap. 354; Deer-
ing's Gen. Laws, Act 3303 l) the Legislature declared: "Dur~ 
ing the fifteen years last past hundreds of districts have been 
organized throughout the State of California under the p~ 
) 
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visions of the Road Distr~ct "'Improvement Act of 1907 and 
the Acquisition and Im~ovement Act of 1925. Many of 
these districts were created during times of great economic 
prosperity and high land values. In many of such districts, 
due to the optimism of the times, Or other causes, bonds for 
public improvements w~re issued in amounts in excess of the 
ability of the lands of Such districts to bear the assessments 
necessary to pay th€ principal and interest on such bonds. 
Millions of dollars in assessed land valuation are located 
within districts created under these acts. Due to the present 
economic depression land val~es throughout the State have 
shrunk to the point where, in many cases, the total assessed 
valuation of all lands within a given district is less than the 
face value of the bonds outstanding in such district. Annual 
assessments upon individual parcels of land within these dis-
tricts amount in many instanceS to more than the assessed 
value of such land. 
"Under present economic conditions property owners are 
unable to meet these high assessments and hundreds of such 
districts throughout the State have reached a point of hope-
less delinquency. 
"Inasmuch as the property owners of these districts cannot, 
under the law, pay their county or municipal taxes without 
at the same time paying the district assessments many cities 
and counties are unable to collect large sums of money badly 
needed for the purposes of government. 
"1)fany hundreds of properties in these districts are being 
deeded to the State for delinquent taxes and assessments and 
unless the financial aid of the counties is immediately made 
available to assist these overburdened districts thousands of 
parcels of lands will be stricken from the tax rolls this yearj 
thousands of property owners will lose their homes, millions 
of dollars in governmental revenue will be uncollectible and 
at the same time thousands of bondholders will be unable to 
realize any return upon their investments." 
According to the allegations of the complaint, the economic 
situation of Acquisition and Improvement District No. 11 
in the city of South Gate was exactly that which the relief 
statutes were enacted to remedy. Because of the inclusion of 
the levy for special assessments in the total amount of munic-
ipal taxes standing against a large portion of the property 
in the district and the sharp reduction in real estate values, 
the owners were unable to meet their tax obligations and 
delinquencies for he yean were eommoo. 
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Full relief was given by the board of superVisors which, by 
its resolution determined that this economic distress was occa-
sioned by the excessive and burdensome special assessments. 
The county p~chased all of the outstanding bonds and sent 
all of them to the city of South Gate for cancellation. Pur-
suant to the county's request, a~l of the bonds were canceled 
and, as the city and cOlaty each declare, these acts were done 
with the intention of the cOunty to retain no claim for the 
repayment of any portion of the $29,550 which it expended 
for the bonds. 
Yet, under these circumstances, it is vigorously contended, 
the property owners who could not meet their taxes because 
of the excessive and burdensome bond requirements were 
left by the action of the county with a lien against their 
property which could neither be enforced nor removed. Such 
a result runs counter to every principle of equity and fair 
dealing and does not give the full relief which was given by 
the county. 
[1] Manifestly, the relief legislation was enacted to aid; 
property owners whose taxes were delinquent; the fact of de- i 
linquency was stressed by the Legislature and recognized by 
the board of supervisors as the justification for extending 
relief. Undoubtedly the county acted in part for the benefi~' 
of those property owners who had paid the assessments levied 
prior to the cancellation of the bonds, but the situation which 
the relief statutes were designed to remedy was the large: 
number of tax delinquencies. For the county to purchase the I: 
honds and cancel them but to leave the property owner with \ 
the same delinquent assessment which he had before would \ 
not meet the purpose of the legislation. If the assessments', 
which the owner did not pay because of economic conditions ' 
could then be collected from him, the full relief intended by 
the statute, that is, to get the property back on the tax rolls, 
would not have been accomplished. For the land to be sub-
ject to the lien of delinquent assessments which could not be 
removed would also be contrary to the legislative purpose. 
Under these circumstances. the amount paid by the Siwel 
Company under protest was either "eI'Nneously or illegally 
collected" from it within the meaning of section 5096 of the 
Revenue and Taxation Code. The word "taxes" as used in 
that statute "inCludes assessments collected at the same time 
and in the same manner as county taxes." (§ 4801.) [2] More-
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roneously or illegally levied but authorizes the refund of taxes 
"erroneously or illegally c9lJ~cted." (Evans v. County of San 
Joaquin, 67 Ca1.App.2d 1(52, 455 [154 P.2d 468].) The use 
of the word "collected" rather than the term "levied" or 
"assessed" is most significant. (Compare section 4986 au-
thorizing a canceJ1ation of ~es ~"levied or charged .... 
erroneously or illegally.") 
This conclusion does not allow a property owner to with-
hold payment of an assessment and es<:ilpe liability for the 
amount levied against his land if and when the collections 
from other owners in the district provide sufficient money to 
meet the principal and interest requirements upon unpaid 
bonds. For it is only when the board of supervisors, acting 
pursuant to the authority granted by the relief legislation 
8,nd for the purpose of meeting economic distress within an 
assessment district, purchases and cancels all of the outstand-
ing bonds and authorizes their cancellation that the delin-
quencies of the property owner are forgiven. 
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court 
to overrule the general demurrer to the complaint and to pro-
ceed in accordance with the views here expressed. 
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of reversal and 
am in accord with the views expressed in the opinion pre-
pared by Justice Edmonds, but I believe there are other 
grounds for reversal than those advanced in said opinion. 
Briefly put we have a situation in which an improvement 
was carried out by the city of South Gate in a certain por-
tion or district of that city. To defray the costs of it bonds 
were issued by the city. Those bonds were not general obli-
gations of the city but their payment was secured by the levy 
of a special assessment on the property in the district which 
WaR benefited by the improvement. Economic conditions 
impelled the Le/rlslature to enact laws for the relief of the 
property in the district and for the broad purpose of restor-
ing that property to the tax rolls in order that the general 
revenue should not suffer. (Sts. and Hy. Code, §§ 1626. ]626.5, 
1627, 1628.) 
The position taken by respondents is that the relief legis-
lation may be interpreted to mean that the county may pur-
chase all of the bonds, cancel them and turn them over to the 
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city. The latter may then cancel all or no part of the assess-
ments which have been levied to retire the bonds. In other 
words, the city could collect all of the assessments and devote 
that money to whatever municipal purpose it desired in spite 
of the fact that the f!lo~ey en?bling the city to so act came 
from the county. SfIch broad discretion in the city with 
respect to cancellation of tfssessment amounts in effect to a 
gift by the county to the city, for the county would have no 
control over the extent to which assessments were cancelled 
although it supplied the money for'that purpose. The gen-
eral taxpayers of the county would be compelled to pay for. 
purely muni~ipal activities of the city. To 80 interpret the 
act is to render it ~unconstitutional. Article IV, section 31" 
of the Constitution of California, provides: "The Legisla-
ture shall have no power to give or to lend, or to authorize I 
the giving or lending, of the credit of the State, or of any 
county, city and county, city, township or other political 
corporation or subdivision of the State now existing, or that 
may be hereafter established. in aid of or to any person. 
association, or corporation. whether municipal or otherwise, \ 
or to pledge the credit thereof, in any manner whatever, for, 
the payment of the liabilities of any individual, association, 
municipal or other corporation whatever; nor shall it have 
power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, 
of any public money or thing of value to any individual, 
municipal or other corporation whatever." [Emphasis added.] 
In applying the foregoing provic;ion of the Constitution this 
court stated in City of Oakland v. Garrison, 194 Cal. 298, 
303 [228 P. 433] : 
"Section 31 of article IV of the constitution provides in 
effect that the legislature shall have no power to authorize 
the making of any gift of any public money to any municipal 
corporation. It may reasonably be concluded. and we shall 
assume for the purposes hereof, that this provision would 
prevent the appropriation of county funds to a municipal 
corporation even for a public purpose, if that purpose were 
purel~' municipal and of no interest or benefit to the county 
as a political subdivision." There are only two situations 
here involved in which the county may transfer its funds to 
a city without violating the Constitution. The first is where 
the purpose is to restore property to the county tax roll and 
thus lessen the burden of the general taxpayern of the county; 
The county thus benefits and the purpose of the transfer of 
) 
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funds and use thereof is a public one and no gift has been 
made. This ordinarily arises ~here the county cancels assess-
ments in special assessment districts. Such was the case in 
County of San Diego v. fiammond, 6 CaJ.2d 709. 728 r59 
P.2d 478, 105 A.L.R. 1155J. where thi~ court !!tated: "Re_ 
spondents further complain tJ1fIt the improvementR for which 
bonds werE' iRsued in some lnstance~~induded water mains or 
sanitary sewers, or both, arrd that the count~· could not in the 
first instance have levied a tax for such purposes. It will 
be noted, however, that we have not based our conclusion 
that the county may contribute toward the payment of said 
original bonded indebtednes..q upon the ground that the county 
could in the first instance have paid a part of the cost of said 
improvement, but upon the ground that the purpose of the 
payment of a portion of said indebtedness is to relieve the 
property in said delinquent districts of the heavy burden of 
taxes existing against it in order that the property may be 
restored to the tax rolls of the county and thereby and there-
aft~r bear its proportionate share of the expense of maintain· 
ing said county." rEmphasiR added. ) However, in the case 
at bar, if the city may in itq discretion refuse to cancel any 
assessments although the county has with itq funds paid or 
cancelled the bonds, and may collect the assessments, the 
property will not be returned to the r.ounty tax roll for it has 
not been relieved of the assessments. The county and itR gen-
eral taxpayers have not benefited and hence no county publie 
purpose has been served. The only way that the desired 
result may be accomplished is that the assessments are nec-
essarily cancelled to the extent that the county has used its 
funds to purchase and cancel the bondR. 
The second county public purpose. and hence not a gift, 
which might be achieved would be where the money spent 
is used for improvements in which the county has an interest 
as distinguished from those of purely local city concern. We 
have no !ffich mtuation here. There is no restriction upon 
what use may be made of the asseSRllent.'l collected by the 
city after the bond!: have been retired. The statute under 
which the bonds were issued provide.q: .. Any money remain-
ing in any acquisition and improvement district interest and 
sinking fund after all of the bonds of the district have been 
retired shall be transferred to the general fund of the . . • 
municipality, as the cafle may be. whORe l~giRlative body has 
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be used in repairing any public way in said district, regard-
less of whether a portion or all of the district as originally 
formed may have been included within one or more munici-
palitieR which did not include such portion or all of the dis-
trict at the time the proceedipw; for the same were initiated!' 
(Stats. ] 925. p. 892. § 41.) It is very doubtful that that sec- ' 
tion has any application to t~ funds involved in the instant 
case, but even if it be assumed that ~ does, the money col- i 
lected may be used for repairing publIc ways in the city in 
which the countv has no conceivahle interest. Hence there is 
a gift by the COll~ty to the city for a purely municipal purpose. 
It is not to be supposed that the Legislature intended to 
authorize the county to give fundR to the city and leave it I 
to the arbitrary power of the latter to use them for other 
than county purposes, thus violating article IV. section 31, 
of the Constitution. And what is more, vest in the city the 
power to completely thwart the sole purpose of the relief 
statute, that is, to restore the property to the county tax rollR. 
It must necessarily follow t.hat when the county, acting pur- I 
suant to the relief statute, buys the bonds and cancels them. 
the city must cancel the assessment.'1 in a corresponding' 
amount. 
The foregoing interpretation of the statute is fortified by": 
the expressions therein that the bonds which may be purchased' 
by the county are those connected with an improvement from· 
which the county benefit.'l. It provides: "It is the intention 
of this section that the expenditures authorized in section 
1625.5 shan not be made. and that the funds specified in 
section ] 627 shall not be expended for any of the purposes 
authorized in sectionR 1626 and 1626.5. i,f the p-u'blic high-
ways, 'bridges or culverts are of only local use." [Emphasis 
added. 1 (Sts. & By. Code, § 1628. ) If the city may devote 
the money to purely local uses. t.he above safeguard is mean-
ingle..'lS. 
The relief legislation here involved contains the following 
provision: "Whenever as the result of the retirement, can-
cellation or redemption of bonds as in this section provided, 
the legislative body which conducted the proceedin~ for the 
issuance of such bonds by resolution duly passed determines 
that there is sufficient money in the intere.'lt and mnking fund 
or other proper fund t.o adequat('ly provide for the retirement 
or pa~JTl(>nt (If the pena lti('s. interest and principal of all 
outstanding bonds of such district as the same are or shall 
) 
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was an overwhelming number of delinquencies on special 
assessments throughout the state, often exceeding the actual 
value of the lands assessed. Emergency legislation became 
necessary to rescue the special assesment districts from in-
solvency and to enable the lands therein to bear their share 
of the general tax burden. County boards of supervisors were 
given wide powers to relieve special assessment districts and 
to liquidate in whole or in part the indebtedness of such dis-
tricts by purchasing and cancelling their bonds. The legisla-
tive bodies that conducted the proceedings for the issuance 
of the bonds were given discretionary power to cancel de-
linquent assessments of such districts if they determined that 
the relief of the district required such cancellation. The per-
tinent provisions of this legislation are quoted in the margin.· 
Pursuant to this legislation defendant county purchased 
the outstanding bonds and delivered them to defendant city 
for cancellation. The defendant city refused to exercise its 
power to cancel the delinquent assessments of the district. 
The county, which collected the city's taxes, therefore col-
lected the delinquent assessments levied against plaintiff's 
land for the years 1934 t.o 1937. Plaintiff paid the delinquent 
-seauou 1626, 1626.6, 1627 and 1628 of the Streetl and Bigh~ 
Coc1e (u amended by Stats. 1935, pp. 2178, 2199, State. 1937, p. 180) 
pnride: 
"'1628. la a.eeordance with the provlSions of sections 1627 and 1828, 
the boardI 01 IAlpervi80rs in their respective counties may purchaae or 
ncleem at a discount, and may at any time in their discretion can.cel or 
retire bonda of any lpecial 8118essment district, for the payment of 
which apeeUtJ 888e8SIllents, levied wholly or partly in accordance with 
the UIe8I8d value of lands, or levied by direct 888essment, have been or· 
are to be levied if the proceeds of IAlch bonda are or have been used 
ealuaively for the &equisition of rights of way or easements for, or for 
the oonstruction, mamtenance, improvement or repair of highways, 
bridges or culverts within IAlch county or any city therein. The board 
may alao pay any portion of the principal or interest of, or transfer IAlch 
Ulount u the board deems proper to the interest and Bi.nking fund for 
the discharge and payment of, any of IAlch bonds. Such bonds may be 
redeemed or pnrch8l!led at not to exceed eighty per cent of the face value 
of the unpaid principal and interest of lAleb bond.. Whenever &8 the 
result of the retirement, cancellation or redemption of bonds as in thi8 
section provided, the legislative body which conducted the proceeding8 
for the issuance of IAlch bonds by resolution duly passed determines that 
there ia I1liIicient money in the interest and linking fund or other proper 
fund to adequately ~rovide for the retirement or payment of the. ~­
ties, interest and prmcipal of all outstanding bonds of IAlch distnct u 
the lUIle are or shall fall due, such legislative body may, in its diacre· 
tion, direct the cancellation or, if its taxes are collected through an· 
other legialative body it may in its discretion by resolution order such 
other legislative body to direct the cancellation of all or any portion of 
tile 1IIlpaid tall and UI8IBDlents and the penalties thereon and the liea 
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assessments under protest and filed a claim with the county 
for a refund on the ground that the assessments were ille-
gally collected. The county denied the claim maintaining 
that it was under a duty to collect the uncancelled assess-
ments. The trial court upheld general demurrers interposed 
by both defendants to plaintiff's complaint and entered a 
judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff appeals. 
Plaintiff does not question the legality of the assessments 
as originally levied or the fact that the assessments on its 
property were delinquent while the bonds were still outstand-
ing. Nor does it contend that the collections could be re-
funded had its assessments been paid before the bonds were 
cancelled. It does contend, however, that there is a funda-
mental principle of special assessment law that an assessment, 
even though validly levied and legally collectible when it 
became delinquent, becomes illegal after the bonds are re-
tired, since its collection is no longer necessary to redeem 
the bonds. The alleged invalidity under this so-called prin-
ciple arises, not from any defect in the assesments, but from 
thereof levied or to be levied for the payment of Rch penalties, prin-
cipal and interest. Such direction to cancel tues shall be made to and 
the cancellation shall be made by the officer having control of the record 
thereof, with the written consent of the district attorney, county counsel, 
city attorney or other legal advisor of the legislative body directing the 
cancellation. Whenever only a portion of such tues, assessments and 
liens are cancelled, it mar be accordin~ to any uniform plan which in 
the discretion of such legIslative body 18 deemed equitable. Where such 
property has been deeded to the State or other subdivision for Buch 
delinquent taxes or assessments a credit in similar amount shall be 
A.llowed upon the amount necellBary to redeem. The officer who makes 
the cancellation of taxes, assessments and liens as hereinabove provided 
shall notify the State Controller or corresponding officer of such other 
subdivision of the credit which shall be allowed upon the right of re-
demption and such State Controller or such other officer shall thereupon 
allow such credit;' provided, however, that in all respects except the col-
lection and disbursement of redemption money the tax deed shall not 
be affected and shall remain unimpaired. , 
"1626.5. In accordance with the provisioDs of sections 1627 and 
1628, the boards of Rpervisors, in theIr respective counties, may appro-
priate money to refund, repay and adjust, and may refund, repay and 
adjust, by any method established by law, the principal, or any portion 
of the principal, of any special assessments or bonds i88Ued to represent 
special assessments, which have become liens on lands and which have 
been levied under the direct or specific assessment method to pay for 
the acquisition of rights of way 01' easements for, or the construction, 
maintenance, improvement or repair of public highways, bridges, or 
culverts within such county or any city therein. It the board of super-
visors shall appropriate money to refund, repay or adjust assessments 
or bonds levied or issued by a city, it may delegate to the legisla.tift 
27 C.2d-.M 
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the fact that a property owner successfully delays payment 
of his share thereof until others have met the cost of the 
improvement represented by the bonds. There is no such 
principle of special assessment law. Nor could such a prin-
ciple be adopted without repudiating the long established 
role that special assessments are to be levied in accordance 
with benefits. To forgive the delinquent property owners 
solely because the nondelinquent owners or others have paid 
enough to meet the cost of the improvement would defeat the 
very object of making the levies in proportion to benefits and 
discriminate against those who pay thcir assessments. At the 
time of the levy, after the property owners are given noti~ 
and an opportunity to be heard, the share of each property 
owner in the burden is determined. It is impossible at that 
time to foresee what amount will actually be collected or in 
what order collections from each owner will be made. If the 
subsequent existence of funds in excess of the redemption 
price of the bonds invalidated the collection of delinquencies 
the shares of the individual property owners in the common 
burden would be· fixed by the accidental course of the collec-
body of such city the disbursement of the funds appropriated therefor 
on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the board ;;d 
the city. 
"1627. The expenditures authorized in sections 1626 and 1626.5 may 
be made from: (a) The general fund of the county ••• 
"1628. Before any expenditures are made under the authority of 
section 1626.5 or of sections 1626 or 1626.5 and 1627, the board of 
supervisors of the county shall, by a resolution adopted by a four-1I.ftha 
vote of the members of the board, determine that the bonds or assess-
ments, or the portions thereof, under consideration were issued or levied 
to acquire rights of way or easements for, or to construct, maintain, 
improve or repair public highways, bridges or culverts of general county 
use, and not of a purely local use. It is the intention of this section 
that the expenditures authorized in section 1626.5 shall not be made, 
and that the funds speci1i.ed in section 1627 shall not be expended for 
any of the purposes authorized in sections 1626 and 1626.5, if the pub-
lic highwayS, bridges or culverts are of only local use." 
Act 33031, Deering's General Laws (Stats. 1935, p. 1250), pro-
vides: Section 1. "The legislative body of any city or county, or city 
and county, of the State of California, acting· individually or in con-
junction with any other such legislative body or bodies, wholly or partly 
within the boundary of which any special assessment district has been 
created, and the outstanding bonds or indebtedness of which district 
are payable by taxes or assessments levied wholly or partly in accordance 
with the assessed value of lands or property, shall be and it is hereby 
fully and completely authorized and empowered, on the consent of the 
owners or holders of such bonds or indebtedness, to purchase, adjUlt,! 
liquidate or cancel such bonds or indebtedness, or any part of them or 
it, and to carry out any plan or plans for the purchase, adjustment, 
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tions rather than by the fair distribution of that burden at 
the time of the levy. 
In fixing the amount of an assessment, it is common prac-
tice for an assessing body to make the levy higher than it 
would have to if there were no delinquencies-a practice sanc-
tioned by this court under the very act here in question. 
(A'nterican Securities 00. v. Forward, 220 Cal. 566, 572··577 
[32 P.2d 343].) Only by anticipating delinquencies at the 
time of the levy can an assesment district expect to meet the 
payments on the bonds as they fall due. It does not, however, 
thereby forgive delinquent owners their share of the common 
burden. If collections of delinquent assessments became il-
legal as soon as the bonds were retired or enough money was 
on hand to retire them, delinquent property owners would 
reap a reward for their delinquency at the expense of those 
who paid their assessments. There would then inevitably be an 
overwhelming delinquency in the final years of any bond issue 
that would play havoc with the orderly collection of assess-
ments. Many owners would soon learn that they could let 
their special assessments go delinquent without ha"\"ing to let 
their general taxes go delinquent (Loew's Inc. v. Byram, 11 
of them or it, and if necessary or advisable to carry out such plan or 
plans under the bankruptcy laws of the United States of America, and 
any amendments thereto now or hereafter adopted, or under any law 
or laws of the State of California, enacted for the purpose of the pur-
chase, adjustment, refunding, liquidation or cancellation of bonds or 
indebtedness of special assessment districts. In carrying out any such 
plan or plans the legislative bodies herein mentioned are fully author-
ized and empowered to adjust, waive or cancel in whole or in part, any 
tax or taxes, assessment or assessments, penalty or penalties and interest 
heretofore levied or taxes against any of the property or properties in 
such special assessment district which have been taxed or levied for 
the purpose of meeting the bonds or indebtedness of such special assess-
ment districts." 
Section 2. "Such legislative body or bodies shall be and hereby are 
also fully and completely authorized and empowered to enter into any 
plan, contract, agreement, escrow or trusteeship having for its purpose 
the purchase, adjustmenij liquidation or cancellation of the outstanding 
bonds or indebtedness or such districts." 
Section 3. "Such legislative body or bodies are hereby also fully 
and completely authorized and empowered in connection with the fur-
therance, consummation or conclusion of any such plan or plans, con· 
tracts, agreements, escrows or trusteeships to appropriate and use any 
and all necessary funds, moneys, taxes, assessments and contributions, 
from whatsoever source derived, for the furtherance, consummation and 
conclusion of the purchase, adjustment, liquidation or cancellation of 
any bond or bonds, indebtedness or indebtednesses, in whole or in part 
of such districts, and to pay from such funds, moneys, taxes, t1.!'~eslt­
menta and contributions all expenses necessary to earry on-the :further-
&nee, consummation and conclusion of 111M plan or plana." 
) 
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ments of more conscientious owners to relieve them of the 
necessity of paying their own assessments. 
Likewise, delinquent assessments are not forgiveJl when the 
money to purchase and retire the bonds comes from the gen-
eral funds of the county. The relief given the district by the 
county under the einergency legislation of 1935 did not auto-
matically cancel the delinquent assessments. Such assessments 
could have been cancelled under that legislation had the legis-
lative bodies concerned, who alone have that authority, con-
sidered such cancellation necessary. (Sts. & Hy. Code, §§ 1626, 
1626.5; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act. 3303 l, § 1; Stats. 1935, 
p. 1250.) That legislation expressly provides that cancella-
tion of the assessments depends not only upon retirement of 
the bonds but on action of the appropriate legislative body. 
The authority to cancel assessments upon the retirement of 
the bonds is given by the same statutory provisions that vest 
in the legislative bodies the authority to purchase and rettre 
the bonds, and it is a repudiation of those provisions for this 
court to hold that the assessments are automatically cancelled 
upon purchase and retirement of the bonds. There are many 
reasons why the statutes make such cancellation discretionary 
with such legislative bodies. Careful study must be made or 
any district before it can be detennined which assessments 
should be cancelled and which not. Delinquencies may vary 
through the years preceding the last one, when there may be 
a total delinquency. If assessments for the last year only were 
cancelled, all property owners would be treated alike. It might 
be highly inequitable, however, to cancel the assessments of: 
the earlier years when some paid and others did not. If the 
source of a district's difficulty were an exceptionally large 
levy for a single year, the property might be rehabilitated by 
cancelling, not all the assessments, but only the aMessment • 
for that y ar.. 
The legislative body of the defendant city in the present ' 
ease decided that the assessments should not be cancelled, and '" 
its judgment has been vindicated by the fact that the property 
was ,so rehabilitated that the assessments could be and were 
paid. In the absence of cancellation of the assessments under 
the relief legislation of 1935, their collection is governed' by 
section 41 of the Acquisition and Improvement Act, which 
provides that assessments shall be "collected and enforced in 
the same manner and by the same persons and at the sume 
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time and with the same penalties and interest as are other 
taxes for state and county purposes .•• and all laws ap-
plicable to the levy, collection and enforcement of taxes for 
state and county purposes ••. (as the case may be) are 
hereby made applicable to said special assessment taxeR. ,. 
The assessments against plaintiff's property were validly 
levied and placed upon the tax rolls. Since they were never 
cancelled, but continued on the rolls as valid liens against the 
property, section 41 compels their collection unless enforce-
ment of that section violates some constitutional provision. 
The contention is advanced that collection of delinquent 
assessments after the county has purchased and cancelled the 
bonds would result in an impairment of contracts in viola-
tion of the federal as well as the state Constitution. This con-
tention is based on the provision in section 41 imposing upon 
the municipality the duty to levy a special asses..<;ment tax in 
an amount clearly sufficient "to pay the principal and interest 
of said bonds as the same shall become payable." The theory 
is that the language quoted forms part of the contracts of the 
property owner with the bondholders and the district and 
does not authorize an assessment except to obtain money to 
pay the principal and interest of the bonds. It will be noted 
that the foregoing provision refers to the "levy" of the assess-
ment, and not to its collection. There is no contention that 
any of the levies in the present case were unnecessary for the 
purpose defined in the provision quoted; the alleged impair. 
ment of contracts cannot therefore result from any failure 
to observe that provision. Nor has there been any failure to 
comply with the "collection" provisions of section 41, which, 
as we have seen, compel the collection. of assessments in the 
same manner as taxes for county purposes generally. The 
terms of any contract under the Acquisition and Improvement 
Act have thus been observed both as to thelevy of the assess-
ments and their collection. Moreover, the emergency legislation 
of 1935, pursuant to which the bonds were purchased and can-
celled, did not enlarge the burden of plaintiff or other prop~rty 
owners but on the contrary materially reduced it. All the 
property in the district was relieved of the burden of assess-
ments in subsequent years to meet accruing bond interest and 
principal. At the outset the property owners were entitled to 
relief from neither past nor future levies. Solely by virtue 
of a contribution by the county from its general funds have 
the owners been given relief from future levies. Such allevia-
-----_ .. _' 
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tion, which increa.'!ed the value of their properties, cannot ra-
tionaly be interpreted as an impairment of cont.ract rights . 
of cither the delinquent or other owners. The contract clause 
of the Constitution is "intended to preserve practical and 
snbst.;lntial rights, not to maintain theories." (Faitoute Iron 
& s. eo. v. Asbur11 Pm·Z·. ~1I1 F.R fi02, 514 f62 RCt. 1129, 
86 L.Rd. 1629].) 
It iR further contended that the county should have held 
the bonds instead of cancelling them to prevent the collection 
of the delinquent assessments from becoming invalid. The 
assessments continued on the tax rolls as valid liens against 
the property involved. however, and no statute or rule of law 
made their validity dependent on the county's holding the 
bonds until th{' assessments were paid. Bonds were essential 
in the relationship between the city, the bondholders. and the 
property owners. The redemption of the bonds eliminated 
all outside creditors. and made it unnecessary for the county 
to ret.ain the bonds. for the rights of defendants depended, not 
on the county's acquiring the rights of the bondholders, but 
on the relief legislation under which the bonds were purchased 
and cancelled and the delinquent assessments continued on the 
tax rolls. That legislation empowered the legislative bodies 
granting relief to such districts to determine the extent of the 
relief and the conditions under which it should be granted. 
III the present case they determined that the relief should not 
extend to the cancellation of the delinquent assessments but 
t.hat such assessments should be collected. The statutory au-
thority to retain the levied but unpaid assessments on the tax 
rolls after the claims of the bondholders are satisfied enables 
the agency, which, under authority of the same statute satisfied 
those claims, to obtain reimbursement for part of its advances. 
Reimbursement is in order here as in other instances where 
creditors of insolvent debtors accept payment by third parties 
in settlement of their claims and such parties are subrogated 
to the claims of the creditors. (See 4 Williston, Contracts, 
(Rev. ed.) 3628.3664; 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jur. (5th ed.) 640; 
McClintock Equity, 210; 50 Arn.Jur., Subrogation, §§ 28, 70; 
23 Cal.Jur. 920; Meyers v. Bank of America, 11 Ca1.2d92, 94 
[77 P.2d 10841; Brantley v. Kelly, 226 Ala. 47 [145 So. 649].) 
If the purchase and cancellation of bonds by a county, con-
templated by the relief legislation, resulted in automatic ex-
tinguishment of all delinquent assessments in the district, 
the legislative bodies involved would have no discretion with 
) 
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respect to the cancellation of ::Iuch assessments as provided 
by the Legislature, nor could a county obtain reimbursement 
through collection of delinquent assessments for any funds 
advanced to relieve a district in di:;;tress. Such a rule would 
not only discourage advances and tJ1UR serve to defeat the 
purposes of the relief legislation. but would conflict with ib~ 
express provil·:ions that the legislative bodies may use assess-
ments to effect the relief of the district (Deering':;; Gen. Laws, 
Act 3303 I, § 3) and may canccl them in their discretion. 
(Sts. & H~1. Code. § 1626: neerin~'s Gen. fJaws. Act 33031, 
§ 1.) 
The county in the present case has elected not to reimburse 
its general fund out of the collection of delinquent a.<;sessment.~ 
as it could have done under the provisions of the relief legis-
lation. The provisions of the Acquisition and Improvement 
Act therefore control the disposition of the money collected. 
Under section 41 of that act. aU collections on assessment.'1 are 
credited to the interest and sinking fund prescribed by that 
section, and "any money remaining in any acquisition and 
improvement district interest· and sinking fund after all the 
bonds of the district have been retired shall be transferred to 
the general fund of the county, or municipality, as the case 
may be, whose legislative body has had jurisdiction over the 
proceeding and may by said body be used i.n repairi.ng any 
public way in said district, regardless of whether a portion 
or all of the district as originally formed may have been 
included within one or more municipalitie..q which did not 
include such portion or all of the district at the time the 
proceedings for the same were initiated." Thus if assc&"l-
ments were collected in sufficient amounts to retire the 
bonds, subsequent collections of delinquent assessments would 
be credited to the acquisition and improvement district in-
terest and sinking fund and would be money remaining 
therein within the meaning of section 41. It is immaterial that 
the excess arises out of advances by the county rather than 
from the fact that the percentage of delinquencie..'1 WR:;; lower 
than anticipated when the Ss:;;essments were levied. Pursuant 
to section 41, therefore. the money collected would be trans-
ferrell to the general fund of the city of South Gate to be 
used by it in repairing any public way in the district. 
It is contended that only money that WM paid into the 
interest and Rinking fund before the retirement of the bond:;; 
can be regarded as "remaining" therein upon such retire-
) 
) 
744 S. SIWEL Co. 11. COUNTY OF Los ANGEIm [27 C.2d 
ment. The money collected, however, must be credited to the 
interest and sinking fund and remains therein if it is not used 
to pay intere.'~t and principal of the bonds. whether or not it 
was in the fund when the last bond was retired .. The meaning 
of the provision is clear: an~' money credited to snch interest 
and sinkin~ fund shaH be used primariJ:v to pay interest and 
principal of the bonds. credits in exceK~ of thE' total amount 
required shall be transferred to the city'll general fund to be 
used for repairs of publie ways in the district. Plaintiff con-
tends that since there are only a few small public ways in 
the .district. excepting Rtate and county highwaYII. the city 
does not need the money to repair such ways. The statutory 
provision. however. doeP not rePuppose that at the time of 
the transfer of the money t.o the general fund of thE' city there 
is any actual need to repair public wa~'s in the district. nor 
doc,,,! it provide any time limit within which the mone~' must 
be used for that purpose. The fact that thE' preclictable ex-
penses for such repairs are low. given the present lIystem of 
public ways in the district, does not make the transfer invalid. 
The system of public ways in the di!:;trict may be changed 
or the needs for repairs may increase. In any event. even if 
the cost of such repairs were low. t.he useof the money by the 
city would merely extend over a lon~er period than usual. 
Furthermore. a court cannot foresee in litigation concerning 
the collection of delinquent as."Iessment."I whether the city will 
make proper use of the amount to be tranRferred to its gen-
eral fund. It would be time enough to consider RllCh question 
if the city'll use of this money were <,hal1enged in an ftP-
propriatE' proceeding. 
Any doubt as to the constitutionalit~, of section 1626 of the 
Street.'l and Highways Code is resolved by the constitutional 
amendment adopted November 3, 1936. adding lIection 31 (c) 
to article IV : uNo provision of the Constituti~n shall be con· 
strued as a limitation upon the power of the I.legislature to 
provide by general law for the refunding. repayment or 
adjustment. from publie fundR raised or appropriated by the 
United States. the State, or any city. city and county. or 
county for street and highway improvement purposes. of 
assessments or bonds. or any portion thereof. which have be-
come a lien upon real property. and which were levied or 
issued to pay the cost of street or highway improvement. "I or 
of opening and widening proceeclin!lS which may be or may 
have become of more than local benefit. Any such acts of the 
) 
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Legislature heretofore adopted are hereby confirmed and de-
clared valid and shall have the same force and effect as if 
adopted after the effective date of thh> amendment." The 
county's expenditure in the present case to redeem bonds 
issued for the improving of a highway of general county 
use was made pursuant to legislation expressly confirmed 
and declared valid by this constitutional amendment. 
Plaintiff's contentions find no support in the cases on which 
it relies. There is no que..~tion as to the validity of the assess-
ments as originally levied or as to the fact that the assessments 
were a valid lien upon plaintiff's property when they became 
delinquent and when the bonds were still outstanding. The 
cases cited that concern assessments invalid when levied are 
therefore not in point. Thus, in Oon'Mlly v. San Francisco, 
164 Cal. 101, 103 [127 P. 834], the levy was void because no 
bonds had been sold or contracted to be sold at the time it was 
made. In Hellman v. Los Angeles, 147 Cal. 653 [82 P. 313], 
t.he levy was void because the ordinance providing for it 
described bonds that were not in existence. In Smith v. Santa 
:~!onica, 162 Cal. 221, 223 [121 P. 920], land condemned by 
t he state for a park was held immune from sale under a tax 
J iell on the ground that the lien was "merged and lost in the 
title which the state itself has taken." (See, also, 48 Am.Jur. 
(l-t,4.) In the present case no title has been established para-
mount to the lien of the assessments. Plaintiff relies particu-
larly on two lines of cases that are clearly distinguishable. 
In the first, the improvement was abandoned before comple-
tion. (Grimes v. Oounty of Merced, 96 Cal.App. 76 [273 P. 
839]; Bradford v. Oity of Ohicago, 25 TIL 349; Valentine v. 
Oity of St. Paul, 34 Minn. 446 [26 N.W. 457]; Oity of San 
Antonio v. Peters (Tex. Civ. App.) , 40 S.W. 827; Oity of 
San Antonio v. Walker (Tex. Civ. App.), 56 S.W. 952.} In 
the second, the actual cost of the improvement was less than 
the original estimate. (Paving Dist. No.5 v. Fernandez, 144 
Ark. 550 [223 S.W. 24] ; Oity of Ohicago v. Fisk, 123 Ill.App. 
404; In re Schneider, 136 App.Div. 444 [121 N.Y.S. 9]; Wolfe 
v. Edgewood Borough, 58 Pa.Super. 38.) Thus in all these 
cases the assesments exceeded the value of the improvements. 
In the present case, however,the plaintitf has received the 
full benefit of the improvements and has not been assessed 
beyond its cost. In fact, even with the payments in question, 
it has paid less than its pro rata share of the cost of the project. 
All the property owners in the district should be treated alike. 
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The allowance to plaintiff of a refund of the payments of 
its delinquent assessments creates an unfair discrimination 
against the other property owners who paid their assessments 
and who, as plaintiff concedes, are not entitled to a refund, 
and gives plaintiff a windfall as a reward for its delinquency. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
